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EMINENT DOMAIN: SALES OF COMPARABLE
PROPERTY TO A CONDEMNOR AS
EVIDENCE OF MARKET VALUE
IN PENNSYLVANIA
I. INTRODUCTION
Eminent domain has been historically a sovereign power to take
private property for public use. The governing body or an entity
under government auspices exercises this extraordinary power
through condemnation proceedings.' According to the Pennsyl-
vania Eminent Domain Code condemn means to take, injure, or de-
stroy private property for a public purpose.2 When land is taken,
the condemnor, exercising the power of condemnation, is required
to give "just compensation" to the condemnee-property owner. The
Constitution of the United States provides:
[N] or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.'
As the federal government is obligated to compensate property own-
ers by the fifth amendment, so are the individual states obligated
to guarantee due process by the fourteenth amendment. Addition-
ally, a majority of states make similar provisions for "due process
' 4
and "just compensation" 5 in their state constitutions.
The problem is not with the principle that no land may be taken
for a public purpose without just compensation; the problem lies
1. For the purposes of this Comment a direct taking, either total or
partial, will be assumed. A direct taking occurs after a full evidentiary
hearing. A taking is total when the fair market value of the condemnee's
entire property interest remaining after condemnation is zero. An example
is the case in which the owner of a ten-acre tract has all of his land taken
for a dam and reservoir site. Where, however, the fair market value of the
condemnee's remaining property interest is more than zero, the taking is
partial, as in the condemnation of a 50 foot road right-of-way over the same
property. For information on just compensation in a situation of a taking
before proceedings are instituted, see Comment, Eminent Domain: Just
Compensation When the Condemnor Enters Before Instituting Proceedings,
75 DicK. L. REv. 303 (1971).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 201 (1964).
3. U.S. CONSz. amend. V.
4. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; PA. CoNsT.
art. I, § 9.
5. See, e.g., N.J. CoNsT. art. I, § 20; N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 7; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
with the valuation of the land or property interest taken. Assum-
ing, for the purposes of this Comment, that land is needed for a pub-
lic use and that the power to condemn is properly exercised, the
determination of what the condemnee is to receive as "just compen-
sation" must somehow be made. The common guideline is:
Just compensation shall consist of the difference between
the fair market value of the condemnee's entire property
interest immediately before the condemnation and as unaf-
fected thereby and the fair market value of his property
interest remaining immediately after such condemnation
and as affected thereby, and such other damages as are pro-
vided in this article.6
Thus in any condemnation proceeding7 where there is a controversy
over value, the parties must submit proof of fair market value of the
subject property.8 There are usually several methods of computing
fair market value which the courts regard as admissible evidence.
For example, in Pennsylvania the following have been held to be
competent proof of fair market value of the subject property: rents
received or reserved under a lease; 9 capitalization of net rental or
reasonable rental as a percentage of gross sales or gross income;' 0
replacement or reproduction cost;" the cost of adjustments or alter-
ations to remaining property; 12 sales of the subject property;13 and
sales of comparable property. 4
This Comment deals with sales of comparable property as proof
of fair market value. Specifically, two controversies are analyzed:
(1) whether market value of the property subject to condemnation
may be shown by prices in sales of comparable property on the open-
market and (2) whether prices in sales of comparable property may
be shown when the purchaser is a body with the power of eminent
domain. The development of the rules of evidence relating to sales
of comparable properties to a condemnor" is traced and the status
of the law in Pennsylvania is analyzed. A possible legislative meas-
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 602 (1964). See Werner v. Commonwealth
Dept. of Highways, 432 Pa. 280, 247 A.2d 444 (1968).
7. Proper procedure in Pennsylvania is under the Eminent Domain
Code of 1964. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 101 et seq. (1964).
8. "Fair market value" is the accepted standard and its acceptance is
the major foundation of this Comment. However, the standard has been
subject to criticism in recent years. See, e.g., Bigham, "Fair Market Value,"
"Just Compensation" and the Constitution: A Critical View, 24 VAND.
L. REV. 63 (1970). The author criticizes the fair market value concept and
more generally the jury trial procedure in eminent domain as not indemni-
fying the property owner for his loss.
9. Ray v. Philadelphia, 344 Pa. 439, 25 A.2d 145 (1942).
10. Boring v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 435 Pa. 513, 257 A.2d 565 (1969).
11. Hoffman v. Commonwealth, 422 Pa. 144, 221 A.2d 315 (1966).
12. Mott v. Commonwealth Dept. of Highways, 417 Pa. 426, 207 A.2d
872 (1965).
13. Berger v. Public Housing Authority, 380 Pa. 19, 109 A.2d 709 (1954).
14. Gottus v. Redevelopment Land Authority, 425 Pa. 584, 229 A.2d
869 (1967).
15. See generally J. SACKMAN, 5 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 21.3[1]
(rev. 3d ed. 1969). [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]
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ure and alternative rules of evidence on admissibility of sales of
comparable property to a condemnor in Pennylvania are discussed. 16
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF COMPARABLE SALES MADE UNDER
NORMAL OPEN-MARKET CONDITIONS
Most of the states and the District of Columbia have codified the
procedures under which condemnors exercise the power to con-
demn. By either the rules of civil procedure or the related evidence
codes, each jurisdiction controls the evidence which may be admitted
as proof of fair market value. The statutes are basically of five cate-
gories which vary according to the degree of specificity of language.
First, there are statutes which make no provision directly affecting
admissibility of evidence of fair market value.17 It would seem that
the same rules of evidence applicable to other civil causes of action
would be applied under this first type of statute. Similar to the first
type is the second type which specifically provides: "[T]he matter
[shall] proceed and be determined as other civil causes.' 8 The
most widely accepted language is that similar to the Eminent Do-
main Code of Alabama. This third category provides:
The commissioners may view the lands to be subjected, and
must receive all legal evidence offered by any party
touching the amount of damages . .. and the amount of
compensation [the owner of lands] will receive.19
The fourth type of statute, used in several state codes, lists the sub-
jects on which evidence properly may be heard.20 Finally, Pennsyl-
16. Not within the scope of this Comment is the related problem of
expert testimony, i.e. qualifying the expert witness and controlling the state-
ments he makes. See generally E. SNITZER, PENNSYLVANIA EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 705 (1)-1 (1965). [hereinafter cited as SNITZER]
17. "The commissioners shall . .. assess the damages which the
owner will sustain by reason of the appropriation; and they shall file their
written report with the sheriff." IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.14 (1966). Accord,
La., Md., Mass., Mo., N.H., N.J., N.M., Ohio, S.D.
18. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 35-204 (1947). Accord, Okla., Ore., R.I., Wyo.
19. ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 13 (1958). Accord, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 48-12 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10-6108(e) (1953); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 7-206, § 7-315 (1967); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-711 (1947); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 36-503 (1933); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 47, § 9 (1965); Ky. REV. STAT. § 416.170
(1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23:156, 3502 (1964); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 213.29 (1967); MINN. STAT. § 117.08 (1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2759
(1957); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9912 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-703
(1957); NEv. REV. STAT. § 37-110 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-17 (1943);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-22 (1943); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1413, 1414
(1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10 (1953); VT. STAr. ANN. tit. 19, § 229
(1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.21 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE § 8.04.110 (1951);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-9, 9a, 10 (1966).
20. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.310 (1962). Accord, Ariz., Fla., Hawaii, Ind.,
Kan., Tex., Wisc.
vania and several other jurisdictions are very specific in admitting
as evidence:
The price and other terms of any sale or contract to sell
the condemned property or comparable property made
within a reasonable time before or after the date of con-
demnation. 1
From state to state the courts have given widely varying interpreta-
tions to the language of similar statutes. Differences of statutory
language aside, the jurisdictions are divided over the admissibility
of evidence of sales prices of comparable property.
A. Minority Rule
The minority rule is that evidence of comparable sales on the
open-market under normal conditions will be excluded. 22 This has
been termed the "Pennsylvania rule. '23 A few states still follow
this rule on the basis that such evidence would raise too many col-
lateral issues, confuse the jury, and unduly prolong the trial.
24
The so-called "collateral issues" which these courts seek to
avoid can become quite numerous and complex. For example, the
similarity of the comparable property to the subject property, both
in character and surrounding conditions, has to be shown. Whether
the price was forced by the necessitous circumstances of the parties
and whether the sale was close in time to the date of condemnation
so as not to reflect market variations or changed conditions in the
neighborhood must also be considered.25 Courts following the exclu-
sionary rule emphasize that the value of evidence of comparable
sales prices is not worth the jury's confusion and the extension of




Although consideration of comparable sales as evidence of mar-
ket value may prolong a trial or even complicate the questions pre-
sented to the jury, the majority of jurisdictions allow prices of open-
market sales of comparable property as evidence of value of the sub-
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 705(2)(i) (1964). Accord, CAL. EvID.
CODE § 815, 816 (West 1966); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-21 (1963);
N.Y. PUB. HOUSING LAW § 125(4) (a) (McKinney 1955); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 25-120 (1962).
22. See generally NICHOLS § 21.3[1].
23. Dempsey, Evidence of Prices in Pennsylvania Eminent Domain
Proceedings, 63 DICK. L. REv. 5, 5 (1958-1959) [hereinafter cited as Demp-
sey]. Now Pennsylvania admits this evidence so the exclusionary rule is
no longer the "Pennsylvania rule." See notes 68-70 and accompanying
text infra.
24. Commission of Conservation v. Hane, 248 Mich. 473, 227 N.W. 718
(1929); State v. Schoberg, 279 Minn. 145, 155 N.W.2d 750 (1968).
25. See generally NICHOLS § 21.3[l]; and 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER
EMINENT DOMAIN § 137 (1953). [hereinafter cited as ORGEL].
26. See, e.g., Neely v. Western Alleghany Railroad Company, 219 Pa.
349, 78 A. 829 (1908).
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ject property.27 The reasoning is that the benefits derived from ad-
mitting this evidence far outweigh the problems. The Missouri Su-
preme Court, in St. Louis K. & N.W. Ry. v. Clark"' stated:
Certainly, no more reliable method of determining the fair
market value of lands can be reached than that derived
from bona fide sales of similar lands in the vicinity. The
objection that such evidence raises collateral issues, as to
the character of the land sold, and the circumstances of
such sales, is more than compensated for by its value in
aiding the jury to a correct conclusion.2 9
The rules of admission vary among the jurisdictions. Some
courts follow the rule that the price of a comparable sale is inadmis-
sible as substantive evidence of value, but can be used on cross-ex-
amination to test the knowledge of an expert witness and the relia-
bility of his opinion.30 Most courts allow admission of evidence of
comparable sales prices on direct testimony as substantive evidence
or as groundwork facts upon which an expert witness' opinion is
based.3 1 As stated by Judge Ashburn in his dissenting opinion in
County of Los Angeles v. Faus:
32
[T] he jurors should know about and consider all matters
which a reasonably prudent buyer would weigh in deter-
mining upon a purchase. Everyone recognizes that the
first thing a prospective buyer of any kind of property
wants to know is what other people have paid for like prop-
erty in the past.
33
III. ADMISSION OR EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OF COMPARABLE
SALES TO A CONDEMNOR
The general statement, often made and quoted by the authori-
ties is that when land is being taken by condemnation, neither the
condemnor nor the condemnee may prove the market value of the
subject property by comparable sales prices if the purchaser is a
condemnor.34 Obviously, in jurisdictions which exclude all evi-
27. See, e.g., Washington Home For Incurables v. Hazen, 70 F.2d 847
(D.C. Cir. 1934); Wilmington Housing Authority v. Harris, 47 Del. 469,
93 A.2d 518 (1952); State v. Williams, 65 N.J. Super. 518, 168 A.2d 233
(1931); St. Agnes Cemetery v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 37, 143 N.E.2d 377 (1957);
Gottus v. Redevelopment Authority, 425 Pa. 584, 229 A.2d 869 (1967).
28. 121 Mo. 169, 25 S.W. 192 (1893).
29. Id. at 185, 25 S.W.2d at 196.
30. See, e.g., Linge v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 260 Iowa 1226,
150 N.W.2d 642 (1967).
31. See cases cited note 27 supra.
32. 304 P7.2d 257 (Cal. App. 1956); rev'd 239 Cal. App. 2d 309, 48 Cal.
2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957).
33. Id. at 268-69.
34. See NICHOLS § 21.33; SIilTzER § 705(l)-2.11; ORGEL § 147.
dence of comparable sales, evidence of comparable sales to a pur-
chaser with the power to condemn is likewise excluded.35 However,
most states which admit comparable open-market sales as evidence
and which have passed on the question of the admissibility of com-
parable sales to a condemnor as evidence have singled out the latter
for exclusion.36 Generally, such sales are not admissible on the
theory that special circumstances surrounding the sales cause prices
to deviate from the fair market value. These sales are believed to
be "forced sales" in that the condemnor can take the land whether
the property owner comes to terms or not.3 7 Furthermore, the con-
demnor may need the land to complete its public project and may
pay more than the fair market value. 38 Thus, there is a degree of co-
ercion, compulsion, or compromise in such sales not inherent in
sales made on the open-market between willing and informed buy-
ers and sellers as envisioned by the fair market value standard. 39 As
the Arkansas Supreme Court in Yonts v. Public Service Co.4 0 stated:
Evidence showing what the company seeking to condemn
has paid for other lands would probably be taken by the
jury as indicating the market value when, as a matter of
fact, it does not tend to show market value of the land. A
company condemning land might be willing to give more
than it is worth, and the owner of the land might be will-
ing to take less than it is worth, that is, less than market
value, rather than have a lawsuit. Moreover, when a com-
pany seeks to get land or condemn it for public uses, hay-
35. See note 24 supra.
36. Southern Elec. Generating Co. v. Lance, 269 Ala. 25, 110 So. 2d 627
(1959); Bridges v. Alaska Housing Authority, 375 P.2d 696 (Alaska 1962);
Yonts v. Public Serving Co., 179 Ak. 695, 17 S.W.2d 886 (1929); Whewell v.
Ives, Highway Comm'r, 155 Ct. 602, 236 A.2d 92 (1967); Wilmington Hous-
ing Authority v. Harris, 47 Del. 469, 93 A.2d 518 (1952); City of Tampa v.
The Texas Company, 107 So. 2d 216 (Fla. App. 1958); De Kalb County v.
Nobel, 122 Ga. App. 373, 177 S.E.2d 117 (1970); Department of Pub. Works
and Buildings v. Pillini, 7 Ill. 2d 367, 131 N.E.2d 55 (1955); State v. Lenox,
250 Ind. 482, 237 N.E.2d 248 (1968); Iowa Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. State,
170 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 1969); Searcy v. State Highway Comm'n, 145 Kan.
709, 67 P.2d 534 (1937); Perlmutter v. State Roads Comm'n, 259 Md. 253,
269 A.2d 586 (1970); Foster v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 244
Miss. 57, 140 So. 2d 267 (1962); Kansas City Power and Light Co. v. Sal-
mark Home Builders, Inc., 375 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. 1964); Lynn v. City of
Omaha, 153 Neb. 193, 43 N.W.2d 527 (1950); Transwestern Pipe Line Co. v.
Yandell, 69 N.M. 448, 367 P.2d 938 (1962); Masheter v. Yake, In Re Appro-
priation for Highway Purposes, 9 Ohio App. 2d 327, 224 N.E.2d 540 (1967);
Durell v. Public Serv. Co., 174 Okl. 549, 51 P.2d 517 (1935); State Highway
Comm'n v. Callahan, 242 Or. 551, 410 P.2d 818 (1966); Scavo v. Common-
wealth Dept. of Highways, 439 Pa. 233, 266 A.2d 759 (1970); Memphis
Housing Authority v. Ryan, 54 Tenn. App. 557, 393 S.W.2d 3 (1964); State v.
Frost, 456 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); State Road Comm'n v.
Christensen, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371 P.2d 552 (1962); Port of Seattle v. Blatz,
59 Wash. 2d 55, 365 P.2d 779 (1961); In Re State Road and Bridge Comm'n,
Blick v. Ozaukee County, 180 Wise. 45, 192 N.W. 380 (1923); Colorado Inter-
state Gas Co. v. Uinta Development Co., 364 P.2d 655 (Wyo. 1961).
37. Coos Bay Logging Co. v. Barclay, 159 Ore. 272, 79 P.2d 672 (1938).
38. Id.
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 603 (1964).
40. 179 Ark. 695, 17 S.W.2d 886 (1929).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
ing the power to condemn, the landowner would prob-
ably come to some agreement with him rather than have
a lawsuit, and this agreement would show a compromise
rather than market value of the land.
41
The language quoted above can apply to comparable sales
whether made to the condemnor who is a party to the transaction
in question or to any purchaser with power to condemn even though
not involved in the current condemnation. The basis for the rule of
exclusion in either case is the possibility of coercion, compulsion,
and compromise in sales to a purchaser who has the legal right to
take the land.
42
However, the rule of exclusion of comparable sales to a con-
demnor is not without its critics and dissenters. Julius L. Sack-
man in NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN noted several courts find "some
dissatisfaction" with the rule of exclusion.4 3 A growing number of
jurisdictions admit sales of comparable property to a condemnor as
evidence.44 The theory of admission of this evidence is best stated
in Curley v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City:
45
Almost all sales, however, are necessarily influenced on
one side or the other by considerations outside the fair
market value of the property. Either the seller is influ-
enced by the circumstances of his affairs, which make it de-
sirable for him to sell even at some sacrifice or else he
thinks he is getting more for his property than its real
41. Id. at 698, 17 S.W.2d at 887.
42. Compare Yonts v. Public Service Co., 179 Ark. 695, 17 S.W.2d 886
(1929) with Eames v. Southern New Hampshire Hydro-Elec. Corp., 85
N.H. 379, 159 A. 128 (1932).
43. NICHOLS § 21.33. E.g., Rayburn v. State, 96 Ariz. 54, 378 P.2d 496
(1963); Eames v. Southern New Hampshire Hydro-Elec. Corp., 85 N.H. 379,
159 A. 128 (1932); Curley v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 83
N.J.L. 760, 85 A. 197 (1912); Commonwealth v. McGeorge, 369 S.W.2d 126
(Ky. 1963).
44. Nash v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Auth., 395
F.2d 571 (1967); State v. McDonald, 88 Ariz. 1, 352 P.2d 343 (1960);
County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 239 Cal. App. 2d 309, 48 Cal. 2d 672,
312 P.2d 680 (1957); Honolulu Redevelopment Authority v. Pun Gun, 49 H.
640, 426 P.2d 324 (1967); Commonwealth Dept. of Highways v. McGeorge,
369 S.W.2d 126 (Ky. 1963); Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Fontenot,
133 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 1961); Amory v. Commonwealth, 321 Mass. 240,
72 N.E.2d 549 (1947); State v. Voyick, 142 Mont. 355, 384 P.2d 765 (1963);
Eames v. Southern New Hampshire Hydro-Elec. Corp., 85 N.H. 379, 159
A. 128 (1932); Curley v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 83 N.J.L.
760, 85 A. 197 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1912); Municipal Housing Authority v.
Rosenblum, 271 App. Div. 184, 63 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1946); Frederickson v.
Hjelle, 149 N.W.2d 733 (N.D. 1967); Bruce v. State Dept. of Pub. Works,
93 R.I. 466, 176 A.2d 846 (1962); Wateree Power Co. v. Rion, 113 S.C. 303,
102 S.E. 331 (1920); Collins v. Pulaski County, 201 Va. 164, 110 S.E.2d 184
(1959); Shaw v. Monogahela Ry., 110 W.V. 155, 157 S.E. 170 (1931).
45. 83 N.J.L. 760, 85 A. 197 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1912).
worth; and on the other hand, the purchaser has some
special need or use for the property which makes it more
valuable to him than to others not having such need, or
else he thinks he is buying at less than the property is
really worth. If the sale, as here, takes place between
parties, one of whom has the power to condemn, it may
likewise be that the seller or the buyer, and possibly both,
are influenced by other considerations as well as by what
they think is the fair market value of the property. The
seller may think if he does not sell amicably he will be
put to the expense of being properly represented at the
condemnation proceedings; but on the other hand, he
doubtless weighs against this the fact that a jury is very
apt to give a liberal market value for properties taken
under condemnation for the very same reason that the
owner is being compelled to sell against his will. The
purchaser, on the other hand, knowing that what the law
requires him to pay is at least the fair value, and know-
ing that a jury is inclined to construe this as meaning a
value particularly fair to the man who sells against his will,
may also be somewhat influenced. But in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances, we are unable to see, as a
general rule, why private sales to parties having the right
to condemn do not come quite as near representing in their
results true market value as do such sales made between
parties, neither of whom have this power.
46
Following the reasoning of Curley, several states have held that
evidence of sales to a condemnor is admissible under certain con-
ditions.47 For example, the party seeking admission must satisfy
the trial court that the sale was free and voluntary, reflecting fair
market value and not compulsion or settlement. 4  This position is
considered a "movement by the courts away from the rigidity of
the exclusionary rule.' '49 Since it is incumbent upon the party offer-
ing evidence of sales on the open-market to show that the sales are
comparable and the ruling on this point is initially for the court,50
the party seeking admission of a comparable sale to a condemnor
should also bear the burden of proving the sale was "free and volun-
tary." However, some courts have not imposed this further burden
of proof. In Eames v. Southern New Hampshire Hydro-Electric
Corp.,51 the condemnor was granted a new trial when the trial court
excluded evidence of what had been paid to other neighboring prop-
erty owners. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that negotia-
tions demonstrate the voluntary nature of the sales and that evi-
dence of comparable sales is admissible,
[U] nless and until the trial court should find that there was
46. Id. at 762, 85 A. 198.
47. See cases cited note 44 supra.
48. State v. McDonald, 88 Ariz. 1, 352 P.2d 343 (1960).
49. Comment, Valuation Under Condemnation, The Admissibility of
Prior Sales To A Condemning Power, 5 ARIz. L. REv. 274, 281 (1964).
50. See Commonwealth v. 108.3 Acres of Land, 431 Pa. 341, 246 A.2d
124 (1968).
51. 85 N.H. 379, 159A. 128 (1932).
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such want of comparable conditions of the properties,
or of freedom to contract of the parties, as to destroy
the probative worth of the sales prices as market stand-
ards.
52
Other courts have stated that evidence of sales to a condemnor
is admissible in the absence of affirmative evidence that the sellers
of the comparable properties were under compulsion to sell.53 In
addition to modifications in the burden of proof, a few courts go
much further in admitting comparable sales to a condemnor as evi-
dence. Several courts admit the evidence out of necessity, where
there have been no other sales in the neighborhood in recent
years which qualify for admission as comparable sales on the open-
market.54 In this case the courts first determine whether there has
been a showing that the sale was not voluntary. The North Dakota
Supreme Court, in Frederickson v. Hjelle,55 stated as grounds for ad-
mission of the evidence that there were no other sales in the neigh-
borhood except those to the railroad, and that there was no evidence
contradicting the owner of the comparable property who testified
that he did not know at the time of the sale that the railroad had
the power to condemn.5 6
Another approach taken is illustrated by decisions in Hawaii
and Louisiana. In both states comparable sales made on the open-
market are admissible as evidence of value of the subject property
in a condemnation proceeding.5 7 Furthermore, evidence of a com-
parable sale to a condemnor is admissible irrespective of whether it
was free and voluntary or made as a settlement of a condemnation
suit.5 8 In these jurisdictions the price received on a comparable sale
is admissible and used as an index of market value, but it is not con-
trolling if the sale was made under threat of condemnation. In other
words, the elements of coercion, compulsion, and compromise go only
to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.
The District of Columbia rule recognizes that normal, open-
market sales of comparable property are admissible as evidence of
52. Id. at 384, 159 A. at 131.
53. Township of Moorestown v. Slack, 85 N.J. Super. 109, 204 A.2d 23
(1964).
54. Wateree Power Co. v. Rion, 113 S.C. 303, 102 S.E. 331 (1920).
55. 149 N.W.2d 733 (N.D. 1967).
56. Id. at 739.
57. See, e.g., Honolulu Redevelopment Authority v. Pun Gun, 49 H.
640, 426 P.2d 324 (1967); Department of Highways v. Levy, 242 La. 259, 136
So. 2d 35 (1962).
58. See, e.g., Honolulu Redevelopment Authority v. Pun Gun, 49 H.
640, 426 P.2d 324 (1967); Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Fontenot, 133
So. 2d 841 (La. App. 1961).
value.5 9 The condemnor is not permitted to introduce sales prices it
has given to owners of comparable property and to this extent the
District of Columbia adhers to the exclusionary rule.60 However, in
Nash v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Authority,61 the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the con-
demnee could introduce the same evidence that a condemnor could
not.6 2 The condemnee attempted to show what the condemnor had
paid for neighboring property in a suit in which the condemnee's
land was being taken for a parking lot. In the District of Columbia
decision the court held that there was little compulsion on the part
of the condemnor since the District of Columbia operates under a
quick taking statute.6 3 Under this type of statute the condemnor
can take property by depositing into court an amount which it con-
siders to be the fair market value. The actual award to the con-
demnee is decided at later proceedings. The reasoning is that the
condemnee may not desire to have the condemnor's unilateral esti-
mate determined pursuant to the quick taking statute introduced by
the condemnor as evidence of fair market value over the objection of
the condemnee but, "there should be an element of estoppel working
against the condemnor's attempt to resist admission of evidence of
such sales," 64 in the situation where the condemnee is attempting
to admit the evidence where it is favorable to him. The Nash court
said:
Whenever the Government decides to pay a certain price, it
has arguably made an uncoerced judgment as to the fair
market value which is relevant in the trial of any other
condemnation of related property, and which, when of-
fered by the condemnee, the trial judge does not err in ad-
mitting, provided he gives the Government a full oppor-
tunity to show to the jury the differences between the two
properties which explain the disparity in the Government's
respective evaluation. 65
The decision in Nash that a condemnee may introduce the same
evidence which a condemnor may not is an anomaly. Moreover,
59. Washington Home for Incurables v. Hazen, 70 F.2d 847 (D.C.
Cir. 1934).
60. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Authority v. 61 Parcels,
235 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
61. 395 F.2d 571 (1967).
62. Id. at 572.
63. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1353 (Supp. V, 1966).
Upon the filing of the declaration of taking and of the deposit
into the registry of the court, to the use of the persons entitled
thereto, of the amount of the estimated compensaion stated in the
declaration, title to the property in fee simple absolute, or such
less estate or interest therein as is specified in the declaration, vests
in the United States of America, and the property shall be deemed
to be condemned and taken for the use of the United States, and
the right to just compensation therefore vests in the persons en-
titled thereto.
64. Bigham, "Fair Market Value," "Just Compensation," and the Con-
stitution: A Cricical View, 24 VAND. L. REV. 63, 74 (1970).
65. Nash v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Authority,
395 F.2d 571, 577 (1967).
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there is little authority for the position that evidence of sales of
comparable property to a condemnor shown to be free and voluntary
by the party seeking admission is nonetheless inadmissible. 66  The
recent trend of the cases indicates that a free and voluntary sale
of comparable property to a condemnor is competent substantive
evidence of value of the subject property and is admissible by either
the condemnee or condemnor.
67
IV. COMPARABLE SALES AS EVIDENCE
IN PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania, as noted earlier, was a strong advocate of the ex-
clusionary rule. 68 It was not until after the Eminent Domain Code
of 196469 that Pennsylvania joined the majority allowing comparable
sales on the open-market as direct evidence of fair market value.
70
Pennsylvania continues to exclude comparable sales to a con-
demnor,71 however.
A. The Law Prior To The Eminent Domain Code of 1964
Snitzer, in his treatise on Pennsylvania eminent domain, states:
"The price paid by the condemnor for adjoining or nearby similar
property was, and is, inadmissible. ' ' 72 There is some case authority
to support this opinion, but the courts have not been entirely con-
sistent.
The rule stated in Pennsylvania Railroad v. Hiester is that a
party can offer no evidence of comparable sales on direct or cross-
examination because collateral issues would be raised.7 3 Prior to
Hiester, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Hays v. Risher,74 had
ruled that a condemnee could not introduce evidence of what the
66. See City of Austin v. Capitol Livestock Auction Co., 434 S.W.2d
423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). However, this decision is doubtful authority
because the court held that it was error but not reversible error to admit
comparable sales to a condemnor even if the condemnee could show the
sales were free and voluntary.
67. See, e.g., State v. McDonald, 88 Ariz. 1, 352 P.2d 343 (1960).
68. Pennsylvania Railroad v. Hiester, 40 Pa. 53 (1861) was the first
case in this over one hundred year trend. See Annot. 118 A.L.R. 869
(1939); 174 A.L.R. 395 (1948); 85 A.L.R.2d 110 (1962).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 101 et seq. (1964).
70. Gottus v. Redevelopment Land Authority, 425 Pa. 584, 229 A.2d
869 (1967).
71. Scavo v. Commonwealth Dept. of Highways, 439 Pa. 233, 266 A.2d
759 (1970).
72. SNITZER § 705(1)-2.11 and cases cited therein.
73. 40 Pa. 53 (1861).
74. 32 Pa. 169 (1858).
condemnor had paid other property owners for similar rights-of-
way.15 In Pennsylvania S.V.R. Co. v. Zeimer7 6 the court held in-
admissible a condemnor's evidence of what it had paid for other
railroad rights-of-way. The exclusionary rule that prices of com-
parable sales whether made on the open-market or to a condemnor
are not admissible evidence when offered by the condemnor or con-
demnee appears to have been firmly established in Pennsylvania.
However, several later decisions approve exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule. In Pittsburgh and Lake Erie R. Co. v. Robinson77 an
expert for the railroad was allowed to state his opinion of value
of the subject property, although the only basis for the opinion was
knowledge of sales in the neighborhood to the railroad. Moreover,
in Burns v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,71 a deed from a neighbor-
ing property owner to a condemnor showing the price paid was
admitted and on appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the
condemnor could explain the consideration.
In a series of decisions the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
changed the rules of evidence relating to comparable sales to al-
low evidence of the price paid in an open-market sale on cross-
examination to test the credibility of expert opinion of value of
the subject property. 9 To this extent Hiester and its collateral
issues problem was no longer controlling.8 0 Two interesting deci-
sions relating to comparable sales to a condemnor followed. In
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. City of Reading,"' the condemnee
solicited on cross-examination the amount that a neighboring
property owner had asked from the condemnor. The question
was worded in a manner which intimated that the owner had re-
ceived the price he had requested. The supreme court held the
condemnor could have the witness state on redirect examination
the price he had received to clarify that the final price was differ-
ent than that requested.8 2 In Lutz v. Allegheny County,8 3 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it was proper to inquire
on cross-examination whether a witness had considered sales to a
condemnor in forming his opinion of value of the subject prop-
erty.814 In Wadsworth v. Manufacturers Water Company8 5 the su-
preme court stated that the exclusionary rule prevents the ad-
mission of prices a condemnor has paid for other lands similar to
75. Id. at 176.
76. 124 Pa. 560, 17 A. 187 (1889).
77. 95 Pa. 426 (1880). But cf. Friday v. Pennsylvania R.R., 204 Pa.
405, 54 A. 339 (1903).
78. 229 Pa. 648, 79 A. 125 (1911).
79. Roberts v. City of Philadelphia, 239 Pa. 339, 86 A. 926 (1913);
Girard Trust Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 248 Pa. 179, 93 A. 947 (1915).
80. See Dempsey, 63 DicK. L. REv. 5 (1959).
81. 249 Pa. 19, 94 A. 445 (1915).
82. Id. at 21-22, 94 A. at 446.
83. 327 Pa. 587, 195 A. 1 (1937).
84. Id. at 590, 195 A. at 2.
85. 256 Pa. 106, 100 A. 577 (1917).
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the subject property;8 6 the court reaffirmed the Hays and Ziemer
principles8
7
In summary, the law prior to the Eminent Domain Code of
1964 was: evidence of comparable sales prices on the open-market
could not be introduced on direct testimony but was proper on
cross-examination to test the credibility of an expert witness;88
and with some perhaps inconsistent exceptions, comparable sales
prices to a condemnor were inadmissible on direct or cross-exami-
nation.8 9
B. The Eminent Domain Code of 1964
The Eminent Domain Code of 196490 made two important
changes relating to admissibility of comparable sales. First, there
is specific authorization for expert testimony on property value on
direct or cross-examination.9 ' The allowance of expert testimony
coupled with the Code statement that evidence of the price of a
sale is admissible means that the prior rule allowing comparable
sales only on cross-examination to test the credibility of witnesses
has been completely abrogated. On sales prices section 705 pro-
vides:
(2) A qualified valuation expert may testify on direct or
cross-examination in detail as to value of the property on
a comparable market value, reproduction cost or capitali-
zation basis, which testimony may include but shall not be
limited to the following:
(i) The price and other terms of any sale or contract
to sell the condemned property or comparable prop-
erty made within a reasonable time before or after the
date of condemnation.
92
The official comment to this section provides:
86. Id. at 112, 100 A. at 579.
87. While stating the rule was for exclusion, the court in Wadsworth
found no reversible error in admission of the evidence since the trial court
told the jury to disregard the evidence and the verdict was fair to all
concerned. Id. at 116-17, 100 A. at 580.
88. Frontage, Inc. v. County of Allegheny, 413 Pa. 31, 195 A.2d 515
(1963).
89. The early decisions are somewhat in conflict and no important
cases were decided between 1917 and passage of the Code: "The most
recent case of substance was that of Wadsworth v. Manufacturer's Water
Company, 256 Pa. 106 (1917)." Brief for Appellee, at 4, Community Hous-
ing Services, Inc. v. Urban Redevelopment Authority, 435 Pa. 344, 253
A.2d 260 (1969); Brief for Appellant, at 19, Scavo v. Commonwealth Dept.
of Highways, 439 Pa. 233, 266 A.2d 759 (1970).
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 101 et seq. (1964).
91. Id. § 705(2).
92. Id. § 705(2) (i).
It is intended by this clause to change existing law which
severely restricts the testimony of expert witnesses on the
ground that "collateral issues" are introduced. This change
is intended to take cognizance of and permit testimony of
all modern appraisal methods.
9 3
Since passage of the Eminent Domain Code of 1964, Pennsyl-
vania courts have admitted evidence of open-market comparable
sales on direct testimony.94 The courts must face collateral issues
in determining whether comparable sales prices will be admitted.
To be admissible evidence, a sale of other property must be: "ju-
dicially comparable"; 95 comparable in character, i.e. having like
mineral deposits; 96 not too remote in location;97 made within a rea-
sonable time of the date of condemnation;9 not a forced sale, i.e.
a sheriff's sale, mortgage foreclosure or other sale where a party is
under undue compulsion.99 Once these threshold questions have
been met, a price on a sale of other property, whether on the
open-market or to a condemnor, should be admissible evidence of
market value of the subject property as "any sale or contract to
sell" comparable property. The official comment to section 705
(2) (i) states:
The purpose of this subclause is to emphasize that any
sale of or contract for agreement to sell the condemned
property or comparable property, if not too remote in time,
is admissible in evidence, both on direct and cross-exam-
ination, as both impeaching evidence and as evidence of
value. 100
Despite the seemingly clear language of the statute and the ex-
pression of legislative intent in the Comment, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in a case in which the properties were obviously
comparable, ruled the evidence of sales price inadmissible since
93. PENNSYLVANIA JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COvMISSION REPORT
§ 705(2) (1964).
94. See, e.g., Gottus v. Redevelopment Authority, 425 Pa. 584, 229
A.2d 869 (1967); Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. 108.3 Acres of Land,
431 Pa. 341, 246 A.2d 124 (1968); North Side Deposit Bank v. Urban Re-
development Authority, 1 Pa. Cmwlth. 274, 274 A.2d 215 (1971); McCue v.
Commonwealth Dept. of Highways, 15 Chest. 72, 41 Pa. D. & C.2d 415
(1966); Rossi v. Commonwealth, 56 Luz. L. Reg. 109, 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 308
(1966).
95. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. 108.3 Acres of Land, 431 Pa. 341,
246 A.2d 308 (1968).
96. Werner v. Commonwealth, 432 Pa. 280, 247 A.2d 444 (1968).
97. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. 108.3 Acres of Land, 431 Pa. 341,
246 A.2d 308 (1968).
98. Compare, Imperatore Enterprises v. Commonwealth, 46 Wash. Co.
94 (Pa. C.P. 1966) with Gottus v. Redevelopment Authority, 425 Pa. 584,
229 A.2d 869 (1967); Bussell v. Commonwealth Dept. of Highways, 17 Chest.
207 (Pa. C.P. 1969).
99. Cf., Buehler v. Commonwealth, 407 Pa. 330, 180 A.2d 898 (1962).
100. PENNSYLVANIA JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT CoM1~fssIoN REPORT §
705(2) (i) (1964). See also, The Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code of
1964, PENNSYLVANIA BAR INSTITUTE PRACTICE MANUA No. 13, at 44 (1970).
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the purchaser was a condemnor.101
Every other state with a provision in procedure or evidence
statutes similar to the Pennsylvania code which has decided the
issue allows evidence of comparable sales to a condemnor to be ad-
mitted if the sale is free and voluntary.102 California specifically
provides against the admission of comparable sales to a condemnor
in its Evidence Code. 103 Yet there are decisions by California
courts which permit evidence of comparable sales to a condemnor
when the party seeking admission proves that the sales were free
and voluntary and therefore a reasonable index of fair market
value. 0 4 With the foregoing as a basis, Community Housing Serv-
ices, Inc. v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh1 5 and
Scavo v. Commonwealth, Department of Highways,10 6 two recent
decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, should be read as
consistent with the proposition that evidence of a sale of comparable
property to a condemnor is not inadmissible per se, if such a read-
ing is possible.
C. Community Housing Services, Inc. v. Urban Redevelopment
Authority of Pittsburgh
1 7
In the first case involving comparable sales to a condemnor to
reach the supreme court after the passage of the Eminent Domain
Code of 1964, the court affirmed the exclusion of the condemnee's
evidence of a comparable sale to the condemnor.'0 8 At issue was
the market value of property in a redevelopment project. The
excluded evidence was the price paid by the condemnor for other
redevelopment property. 1 9 Counsel for the condemnee stated
that the other property was comparable and that since the con-
demnor had to pay fair market value for any property taken, it
101. Scavo v. Commonwealth Dept. of Highways, 439 Pa. 233, 266 A.2d
759 (1970).
102. See, e.g., Municipal Housing Authority v. Rosenblum, 271 App.
Div. 184, 63 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1946); Hewitt v. State, 33 Misc. 2d 868, 227
N.Y.S.2d 52 (1961).
103. CAL. EviD. CowE § 822 (West 1966). See generally Comment, Statu-
tory Rules of Evidence for Eminent Domain Proceedings, 18 HAST. L.J. 143
(1966).
104. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 239 Cal. App. 2d 309,
48 Cal. 2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957); Regents of the University of California
v. Morris, 72 Cal. Rptr. 406, 266 Cal. 2d 616 (1968).
105. 435 Pa. 344, 253 A.2d 260 (1969).
106. 439 Pa. 233, 266 A.2d 759 (1970).
107. 435 Pa. 344, 253 A.2d 260 (1969).
108. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
109. Record at 8. Community Housing Services, Inc. v. Urban Re-
development Authority of Pittsburgh, 435 Pa. 344, 253 A.2d 260 (1969).
should be estopped from asserting that the price paid was other
than fair market value. The condemnor's objection to the evi-
dence was sustained without any attempt by the condemnee to
show the sale was free and voluntary. 110 The court held that the
condemnee failed to show that the alleged error-the exclusion of
comparable sales prices as evidence-was not cured by the verdict.
Since the overall verdict was fair, the error, if indeed there was
error, was not prejudicial; thus the court found no need to rule on
the substantive questions presented. Mr. Justice Pomeroy in his
concurring opinion in Community Housing Services discussed the
merits:
Sales to a condemnor of properties which it could, and if
necessary would, acquire by condemnation are not, in my
judgment, sales on the open-market between a willing
seller and willing buyer. They involve an ingredient of
compulsion on the part of the seller that might make the
"sales price" too low; there may be an ingredient of anx-
iety for speedy acquisition or some other factor operating
on the mind of the authority which would place the "sales
price" on the high side of fair market value. The fact is
that the parties are not only buying and selling real estate,
they are also settling a potential law suit with all the ele-
ments of time, trouble, expense and worry that would be
involved. The properties may indeed be comparable, but
for one reason or another the transactions and the so-called
"sales price" may be higher or lower than if no condem-
nation were involved. To admit such testimony would be
to invite side excursions into all the other related factors;
such collateral matters would only unduly complicate
and delay the trial.1 1" '
Mr. Justice Roberts, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Bell, would
have reversed the trial court's decision and filed a dissenting opin-
ion.1 2 The thrust of the dissent is that the condemnor was under
no significant compulsion to pay more than fair market value for
properties it had taken since Pennsylvania operates under a
"quick-taking" eminent domain law. Therefore, although a con-
demnor may not introduce evidence of prices it paid, the con-
demnee should be able to do so. The dissenters stated that they
would follow the rule of the District of Columbia in Nash v. Dis-
trict of Columbia Redevelopment Land Authority.
1 3
D. Scavo v. Commonwealth Department of Highways 14
In Scavo there was a question of the admission of prices paid
110. Record at 7-9. This is a record of a sidebar conference to deter-
mine admissibility. The transaction over the comparable property was
called a "sale" and there is no mention of the "free and voluntary" nature
of the sale; apparently this argument was not made.
111. 435 Pa. at 349-50, 253 A.2d at 262-63.
112. Id. at 350, 253 A.2d at 263 (dissenting opinion).
113. 395 F.2d 571 (1967), discussed at text accompanying notes 59-65
supra.
114. 439 Pa. 233, 266 A.2d 759 (1970).
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by the condemnor for comparable properties as evidence of fair
market value. The condemnee's property was one of many taken
to build a highway. The three valuation experts for the condemnor
placed a "before taking" market value on the subject property of
$23,500, $22,000, and $20,000. The condemnor's experts stated that
they did not consider the price paid by the condemnor to a nearby
property owner in arriving at their opinion. The condemnee's ex-
pert witnesses did consider this settlement made after the viewers
hearing115 and valued the subject land at $97,000, $95,300, and
$95,000. The trial court admitted the condemnee's evidence and
awarded him $55,000 for the land taken for a highway right-of-way.
The trial court admitted evidence of the prior sale to the con-
demnor since the property sold to the condemnor was in all re-
spects comparable to the subject property. 116 The supreme court
reversed, holding the evidence inadmissible and adopting Mr. Jus-
tice Pomeroy's concurring opinion in Community Housing Serv
ices."' The majority also indicated that although the intention of
section 705(2) (i) of the Eminent Domain Code was to broaden the
permissible scope of testimony, the section did not specifically in-
dicate a desire to change the law with respect to sales to a con-
demnor."" Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted
the statutory provision as changing only the law of the case cited
in the comment, and that case involved a sale made between par-
ties on the open-market and not a sale of comparable property to
a condemnor.1" 9
Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Chief Justice Bell again voiced
their dissent. As in their dissent in Community Housing Serv-
ices, they argued that the condemnor should be estopped from
objecting to the introduction of evidence by the condemnee of
115. Id. at 240, 266 A.2d at 763. The procedure for a hearing before a
board of view is set out in PA. STAT.. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 502-507, 509-514
(1964).
116. Record at 32. Scavo v. Commonwealth Dept. of Highways, 439
Pa. 233, 266 A.2d 759 (1970).
117. 439 Pa. at 239, 266 A.2d at 762. See text accompanying note Ill
supra.
118. Id.
119. See note 100 and text accompanying supra. The case cited by
the Comment is Berkley v. City of Jeanette, 373 Pa. 376, 96 A.2d 118 (1953).
In that case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that evidence of
open-market sales of similar property is not admissible on direct exami-
nation and is not evidence of market value under then existing Pennsyl-
vania law; such evidence is admissible on cross-examination, if the witness
relied on the sale, for the purpose of testing his good faith and credi-
bility. Sales of similar property to a condemnor were not at issue in the
case and were not discussed.
prices paid by the condemnor to other property owners.120 The
dissent can be read as favoring admission of comparable sales to a
condemnor if the party seeking to introduce the evidence were
to show the transaction was as free and voluntary as an "open-
market" sale. The statement made was:
I am not persuaded that we should exclude such testimony
simply because when the condemnor and the condemnee
agree on a price that may be "settling a potential law suit."
There are many extraneous factors which can motivate any
buyer and seller when they agree upon a price, and yet
these private agreements are admissible.
121
V. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSION
It is clear that Pennsylvania has refused to move from its
exclusionary rule and "collateral issues" argument concerning com-
parable sales to a condemnor as evidence of fair market value.
There is a trend in other jurisdictions to admit such evidence. This
is especially true in states which have eminent domain or
evidence code provisions similar to Pennsylvania's Section 705
(2) (i).122 One commentator, urging the abandonment of the ex-
clusionary rule in Pennsylvania wrote:
It is appropriate in concluding to consider an excerpt from
the opinion by the late Chief Judge John Parker of the
Fourth Circuit . . . "Artificial rules of evidence which
exclude from the consideration of the jurors matters which
men consider in their everyday affairs hinder rather than
help them in arriving at a just result.
1 23
A number of proposals to amend the exclusionary rule are
suggested by the cases and commentaries. The adoption of the rea-
soning of the District of Columbia rule as stated in Nash v. District
of Columbia Redevelopment Land Authority and the dissents to
Community Housing Services and Scavo could be effected by add-
ding the following provision to section 705(2) (i) of the Pennsyl-
vania Eminent Domain Code of 1964:
Provided that a qualified valuation expert for the con-
demnee may testify as to the price and other terms of any
sale or contract to sell comparable property to the con-
demnor or other body with the power of eminent domain
made within a reasonable time before or after the date of
condemnation.
The basis for this proposal is that the condemnor is required to
give just compensation, judged by the fair market value standard,
120. Compare, Community Housing Services, Inc. v. Urban Redevelop-
ment Authority of Pittsburgh, 435 Pa. 344, 350, 253 A.2d 260, 263 (1969)
(dissenting opinion) with, Scavo v. Commonwealth Dept. of Highways,
439 Pa. 233, 240, 266 A.2d 759, 763 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
121. 439 Pa. at 241, 266 A.2d at 763.
122. See note 21 supra.
123. Dempsey, 63 DicK. L. REV. 5, 44 (1958-1959).
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for any property taken.12 4 Having paid a price for one property,
the condemnor should not be able to object to the use of this price
as evidence of just compensation when the owner of the property
now being condemned seeks to use that sale to establish the value
of his property. This situation is analogous to a property owner
contesting his municipal tax assessment by pointing to assess-
ments of similar property in the neighborhood to show his prop-
erty is valued too high. 12 Further support for this proposal is
found in the fact that Pennsylvania, like the District of Columbia,
operates under a quick taking statute.1 26  The condemnor may
"take" upon filing a declaration of taking and estimating just
compensation; he is under no complulsion in theory to pay more
than fair market value and, therefore, may not deny that the price
is reasonable evidence of fair market value in a later suit to con-
demn similar property.
It is submitted that these arguments are not persuasive because
a condemnor does not operate in a vacuum and theory is not in-
dicative of practice. The possibilities for coercive factors are
numerous and the condemnor may be desirous of settling a suit
so that for one reason or another he will pay more than fair
market value.' 27 Thus the District of Columbia rule allows the
condemnee the advantage of introducing any sales prices, whether
inflated or fair. This is as unjust as the exclusionary rule which
denies parties the use of evidence of sales to a condemnor which is
as probative of fair market value as evidence of sales under "nor-
mal, open-market" conditions which is generally held to be admis-
sible.
Three alternative solutions are available. One is to abandon
the concept of fair market value and accept the "indemnity theory"
of compensating the landowner.128 This theory is that the govern-
ment should pay what the property is worth to the condemnee and
if this means part of the cost is for settling a lawsuit then the
condemnor must pay that cost as well-he must "pay the piper."
1 2 9
Inherent in this concept is the abandonment of eminent domain
124. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 601-02 (1964).
125. McKnight Shopping Center v. Board of Assessment, 417 Pa. 234,
209 A.2d 389 (1965).
126. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 402, 407 (a) (1964); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
1353 (Supp. V, 1966); see note 63 supra.
127. Brief for Appellant, at 20-21, Scavo v. Commonwealth Dept. of
Highways, 439 Pa. 233, 266 A.2d 759 (1970).
128. Bigham, "Fair Market Value," "Just Compensation" and the Con-
stitution: A Critical View, 24 VAND. L. REV. 63, 66 (1970).
129. Id.
jury trials and the highly technical rules of evidence accompany-
ing this procedure. The suggestion has been made that the matter
be left to a tribunal of experts in condemnation problems which
would be able to consider all elements and evidence of compensa-
tion.
130
Nonetheless, realizing that the jury trial and the fair market
value standard are the accepted framework for eminent domain
determinations, a second alternative has been offered. The argu-
ment against admitting comparable sales to a condemnor is that
the jury might accept the price paid as fair market value when
the price reflects other elements of coercion, compulsion, and com-
promise.
It is submitted that the court could cure this fear in
its phrasing of the instructions to the jury and that such
prices should be admissible, not for the purpose of setting
a floor or ceiling as to the property's valuation, but as sim-
ply another aid to the jury in arriving at the fair market
value of the condemned property.'
This rule goes far in eliminating the inequities of the exclusion
of sales to a condemnor as evidence, but allows evidence which
could only be fair to the condemnor if the jury follows the most
intricate of instructions carefully. The proposal fails in the hy-
pothetical case where the price paid by the condemnor reflects
his desire to settle a suit fearing a jury would be influenced by a
"strong emotional bias since the traditional democratic concept of
the right to land ownership is sorely strained by the practice of
eminent domain regardless of its necessity or constitutionality."' 3 2
Finally, there is a third possible alternative. It is submitted
that a fair rule and the one this Comment views most acceptable is
that a sale of comparable property should be admitted as proba-
tive evidence of the fair market value of subject property, by ei-
ther the condemnor or the condemnee, when the party seeking
to introduce such evidence can show the trial court that the sale
was free and voluntary. The courts should interpret the Eminent
Domain Code of 1964 in light of the stated legislative purpose to
broaden existing laws which unduly restrict testimony on the
ground that "collateral issues" are introduced. 3 This proposal
would require one more proof by the party seeking admission over
and above the proofs required for the comparableness needed to
qualify a normal, open-market sale. Section 795 (2) (i) should be
read in light of section 603 which provides:
130. Id. at 78.
131. Comment, Eminent Domain: Ohio Evidentury Aspects In As-
certaining Market Value, 18 WEST. RES. L. REV. 1687, 1699 (1967).
132. Brief for Appellant, at 20-21. Scavo v. Commonwealth Dept. of
Highways, 439 Pa. 233, 266 A.2d 759 (1970).
133. See PENNSYLVANIA JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION REPORT
§ 705(1), 705(2), 705(2) (i) (1964).
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Fair market value shall be the price which would be agreed
to by a willing and informed seller and buyer; taking into
consideration, but not limited to the following factors:
(reciting factors).i14
The official comment states in part:
This section contemplates first a "willing" seller and
buyer. This means that neither is under abnormal pres-
sure or compulsion, and both have a reasonable time
within which to act. 18 5
The Eminent Domain Code of 1964 suggests that an inquiry be
made to determine whether the comparable sale was free and vol-
untary in any case where its admission is sought. Open-market
transactions are thought to be free and voluntary and are good
evidence, but there is no logical reason why free and voluntary
sales to a condemnor are not good evidence as well. The pro-
posed rule follows the reasoning of most of the recent decisions
which have considered the question of comparable sales to a con-
demnor"" and is the rule where statutory provisions similar to
Pennsylvania's have been enacted.'3
7
Furthermore, Pennsylvania is not precluded from adopting
such a rule, in spite of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's rulings
in Community Housing Services and Scavo. In Community Hous-
ing Services the condemnee failed to show he was prejudiced by
exclusion of evidence of comparable sales to the condemnor and
there was no attempt at trial to show that the comparable sales
were free and voluntary. 8 8 Should a similar case arise and the
condemnee shows he was prejudiced by exclusion, on appeal the
court should remand for a finding of whether the sales were free
and voluntary transactions. The holding in Scavo was that evi-
dence of sales to the condemnor of comparable property for high-
way rights-of-way in settlement of suit are inadmissible.13 9 So
limited, the decision is consistent with the recommended rule. It is
doubtful that settlement of suit is anything but a compromise. A
sale of property for a highway right-of-way which the condemnor
must have to complete a road is seldom a free and voluntary trans-
action.140 Indeed, the exclusionary rule may have its most valid
application to sales for rights-of-way.
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 603 (1964).
135. PENNSYLVANIA JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION REPORT §
603 (1964).
136. See cases cited note 44 supra.
137. See cases cited note 102 supra.
138. See notes 107-113 and accompanying text supra.
139. See notes 114-121 and accompanying text supra.
140. See Commonwealth Dept. of Highways v. McGeorge, 369 S.W.2d
126 (Ky. 1963).
The supreme court should not be bound to follow cases decided
before the Eminent Domain Code of 1964. Such authority, stand-
ing alone is questionable, and must fail in light of the express pur-
pose of the Code to broaden the rules of evidence and do away
with the collateral issues argument. How a party would show a
comparable sale to a condemnor was free and voluntary would,
of course, depend on the factual situation. If cases in other jurisdic-
tions are a guide, a settlement of suit; 141 or a purchase of a right-
of-way are not free and voluntary sales;14 2 but a purchase of land
for a school where the school board considered a number of sites; 1 43
or where the sale was negotiated between the parties without
condemnation proceedings is sufficiently free and voluntary to be
admissible.144 Apart from these somewhat obvious examples, what
is "free and voluntary" is a dispute over which reasonable minds
may differ.
The judicial structure must remain receptive to changes in the
rules of procedure and evidence which will better aid the deter-
mination at hand. In eminent domain this is particularly essen-
tial because the much-valued right to own property is at stake
and dissatisfaction with the compensation received through the
trial court process has already suggested to some the use of an ex-
pert arbitration board to arrive at just compensation. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court might do well to consider the language
of the Kentucky court in Commonwealth Department of Highways
v. McGeorge'4 5 where a freely negotiated sale to a school board
was held to be admissible evidence in a later condemnation suit.
The court said:
Our previous cases following the rule of exclusion are not
overruled. The rule simply does not apply hard and fast
to every instance in which a purchasing party had the
power of condemnation. 146
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141. See, e.g., Mengel Properties v. City of Louisville, 400 S.W.2d 690
(Ky. 1965).
142. Commonwealth Dept. of Highways v. McGeorge, 369 S.W.2d 126
(Ky. 1963).
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Eames v. Southern New Hampshire Hydro-Elec. Corp.,
85 N.H. 379, 159 A. 128 (1932).
145. 369 S.W.2d 126 (Ky. 1963).
146. Id. at 129.
